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With a little burglaree.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year the U.S. film industry loses in excess of $1 billion due to the
unauthorized reproduction of its works.2 Not only is motion picture
piracy a prevalent domestic problem, but it also represents a significant
portion of lost revenue internationally.3 For this reason, the United
States maintains a number of bilateral and multilateral copyright treaties
with foreign nations.4 Yet international film piracy continues to plague
artists, producers and distributors of creative works.' The problem is
compounded by worldwide advancements in electronics technology
I W. GILBERT & A. SULIVAN, PIRATES OF PENZANCE, Act H (1879).
2 A recent survey of the Motion Picture Association of America (the MPAA) estimates that
the U.S. motion picture industry loses more than $1 billion each year in potential revenues from
worldwide film, signal and videocassette piracy which amounts to approximately one-fifth of annual
box-office profits from all U.S. theaters. J. Valenti, Statement of the MPAA 5 (1989) [hereinafter
MPAA Statement]. See also Piracy Costlyfor Hollywood, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1989, at D2, col. 4;
3. Maatta & D. Brennan, Comments on International Video Piracy, 10 HASTrNGS Comm. ENT. LJ.
1081 (1988). (Both John Maatta, Vice President, Business Affairs of N.I.W.S. Productions, Inc., a
subsidiary of Lorimar Telepictures, and Lorin Brennan, Vice President, Business Affairs at Carolco
Pictures and Secretary of the American Film Marketing Association, attribute a substantial portion
of the industry's lost revenue specifically to video piracy); Bollier, At War With the Pirates, 1987
CHANNELs 29, 30.
3 The International Trade Commission reported a loss of $23 billion in 1980 due to "inade-
quate intellectual property protection." United States Trade Representative Carla Hills has esti-
mated that the United States has lost between $43-61 billion in 1986 due to "inadequate and
ineffective intellectual property protection." Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
89 Dept. State Bull. 55 (Nov. 1989) [hereinafter Trade Related Aspects].
4 The two preeminent multilateral copyright treaties are the Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 168 Parry's T.S. 185, as revised at Paris on July
24, 1971 and amended on Oct. 2, 1979, entered into force for the United States on Mar. 1, 1989,-
U.S.T. -, K.A.V. No. 2245, and the Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731,
T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971. For a complete discussion
of the history of these two conventions, see 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 17.01[B] (1989). See also NORDEMANN, infra note 20.
5 See Bollier, supra note 2, at 31.
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which continually require the United States to change its enforcement
tactics.
Given the jurisdictional constraints of U.S. courts abroad,6 the lim-
ited resources of U.S. enforcement agencies, and the complexity of for-
eign legislative provisions, the question of alleviating the costly problem
of international piracy has captured the attention of industry and govern-
ment officials.7 This note will analyze current legislative, enforcement,
and judicial provisions that were enacted to combat international piracy.
While focusing on trade sanctions, this note will also propose solutions to
protect U.S. copyrights in the film industry.'
II. TREATIES, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION
A. Historical Development
International copyright protection has its roots in the national pro-
tection of artistic and creative works from exclusive publishing and print-
ing privileges of the late fifteenth century. 9 These privileges, however,
were slow to develop in the international arena.10 Beginning in the six-
teenth century, French and English works were especially at risk since
their authors were prolific, and those who pirated their materials shared
their language.II Thus, both France and the United Kingdom were ir-
6 See infra note 126.
7 Trade Related Aspects, supra note 3, at 55. See also telephone interview with William Nix,
Senior Vice President, Worldwide Director, Anti-Piracy Operations, Motion Picture Association of
America (Nov. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Nix interview].
8 The problem also afflicts the recording, publishing, and computer industries. ANNENBERO
WASHINGTON PROGRAM, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY STUDIES, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSrITY,
CURBING INTERNATIONAL PIRACY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8-9 (1989)(prepared by G. Hoff-
man) [hereinafter ANNENBERG REPORT]. A study by the U.S. International Trade Commission
reported that the U.S. publishing and printing industries lost approximately $280 million in revenue
as a result of piracy in 1986. Simon, Pursuing the Pirates, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Sept. 15, 1989, at
88. This amount reflects close to twenty percent of the U.S. printing and publishing industry's
potential foreign sales. Id
9 S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTIs-
TIC WORKS: 1886-1986 3 (1987) (Ricketson suggests that the first recorded grant of an exclusive
printing right may have been made by the Venetian Senate to Gio as early as 1469). See also S.
STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS (2d ed. 1989)(chapter 2 dis-
cusses the history of international copyright law).
10 RiCKETSON, supra note 9, at 18-19.
11 Id. As Ricketson suggests:
English authors suffered from the activities of Irish pirates until the Act of Union with
Ireland in 1800, and from those of United States publishing houses throughout the nine-
teenth century.. .French authors, in turn, suffered from the depredations of pirates in
Switzerland, Germany, Holland and Belgium... Piracy was also rampant in the German-
speaking states.. .[and] in the Italian states until their unification.
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portant players in the development of early bilateral agreements for the
protection of creative works.1 2
The numerous bilateral arrangements that were adopted in Europe
well into the late nineteenth century were problematic because the pro-
tection afforded varied significantly, and authors were not necessarily
guaranteed "comprehensive or systematic" copyright protection outside
their own country. 13 The first truly international copyright protection
developed through the implementation of several multilateral interna-
tional copyright treaties, including the Berne Convention14 and the Uni-
versal Copyright Convention.15
B. The Berne Convention
Also known as the Convention Concerning the Creation of an Inter-
national Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the
Berne Convention, adopted in 1886, afforded ten countries 6 copyright
protection beyond their physical boundaries. 7 Several prominent Euro-
pean nations, the Russian empire, as well as the countries in Africa, Asia
and the Middle East remained outside the Convention.' The United
States and several Portuguese republics were not original signatories to
Berne. 19
Historically, the United States enforced registration, term, and no-
tice requirements20 as part of its copyright laws.2 As originally drafted,
12 1& at 27.
13 Id. at 39.
14 Berne Convention, supra note 4.
15 Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 4. The Rome Convention for the Protection of
Performances, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention) and
the Convention for the Protection of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Pho-
nograms developed from the Berne Convention. RICKETSON, supra note 9, at 836.
16 The initial signatories to the Berne Convention were Belgium, France, Germany, Haiti, It-
aly, Liberia, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom (Liberia later failed to ratify the Con-
vention). 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 17.01[B].
17 Article 1 of the Berne Convention states that the countries to which this Convention applies
constitute a "Union for the protection of the rights of authors over their literary and artistic works."
Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 17.01[B][1]; Strauss,
Don't Be Burned by Berne: A Guide to the Changes in the Copyright Laws as A Result of the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 374 (May 1989).
18 RicnnrsoN, supra note 9, at 80.
19 Id.
20 The United States enacted its first copyright law in 1790, closely following the model of an
English act known as the "Statute of Anne." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. Strauss,
supra note 17, at 375. Both the English and the American copyright laws required registration, term
and notice provisions in order to establish copyright protection. Id. The reason the United States
maintained these notice and registration requirements was that copyrights were treated under simi-
lar principles as patents which have historically been subject to such formalities. W. NORDEMANN,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTs LAW 6 (1990). The 1790 Act did not
extend copyright protection to works of foreign origin. Id
1991]
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the Berne Convention specifically rejected these "formality" require-
ments. 22 Although the United States was represented at several of the
original Berne conferences,23 it did not participate in the final design and
implementation of Berne in 1886.24 Thus, the United States could only
obtain protection under Berne by way of the "back door" method.25
Under the Rome Act, this meant that U.S. nationals could receive Berne
Convention protection if their works were first or simultaneously pub-
lished in a Union country. 26 Berne is administered by the World Intel-
21 Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowers the federal government to
enact copyright legislation. In the Act of May 31, 1790, Congress utilized this power to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." After several revisions, the Copyright
Act of 1909 was promulgated. Title 17, U.S.C. § 1 et seq. At the time of its enactment, the 1909
Copyright Act protected books, charts, maps, musical compositions, photographs, paintings, draw-
ings, statuary and fine art. Id Motion pictures and sound recordings were included on the list of
protected items in 1912, and 1971 respectively.
Before 1978, the United States operated under a "dual system" of copyright protection,
whereby the state (or common law) protection began with the creation of a work and terminated
upon its publication. BooRsTYN, infra note 31, § 1:1, at 1-2.
22 Article 4 states, in part, that "[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be
subject to any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of
protection in the country of origin of the work." Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(2). This
language was originally adopted in the Berlin Act, Nov. 13, 1908, 1 LN.T.S. 217, and has remained
unchanged. See infra note 24. See also Strauss, supra note 17, at 375, and Tanenbaum, infra note 34,
at 260-71.
23 RICKETSON, supra note 9, at 80.
24 Strauss, supra note 17, at 375. While its basic principles have remained the same, the Berne
Convention has undergone a number of revisionary conferences:
(1) Additional Act of Paris of May 4, 1896, 182 Parry's T.S. 441.
(2) Revised Berne Convention of Berlin, Nov. 13, 1908, 1 L.N.T.S. 217 (establishing free-
dom from formalities for Union protection and independence of an author's minimum
rights regardless of the domestic country of origin).
(3) Rome Conference of June 2, 1928, 123 L.N.T.S. 233 (abolishing reservations option
except in cases of translations, establishing moral rights of an author and providing for
broadcasting rights).
(4) Brussels Conference of June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 (establishing the minimum
term for protection as fifty years after the author's death).
(5) Stockholm Conference of July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (substantive changes not
implemented due to an unacceptable Protocol regarding Developing Countries).
(6) Paris Conference of July 24, 1971, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 (adding appendix to Article 21
concerning a regulation for developing countries).
NORDEMANN, supra note 20, at 5-6.
25 RCKETSON, supra note 9, at 923-24. See also Tannenbaum, The Principle of "National
Treatment" and Works Protected: Articles I and II, in UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANA-
LYZED 14 (1955)[hereinafter Principle of "National Treatment"]. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 17.04[D][2][a], at 17-29.
26 Rome Act, June 2, 1928, art. 6(1) states that "[a]uthors who are not nationals of one of the
countries of the Union, and who first publish their works in one of those countries, shall enjoy in that
country the same rights as native authors, and in the other countries of the Union the rights granted
by the present Convention." 123 L.N.T.S. at 233. See also, RiCKETSON, supra note 9, at 924 (sug-
V l. 23:623
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lectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva, Switzerland.27 WIPO
assumed these duties from the Bureau of the Union after the Stockholm
Conference of 1967.28
C. The Universal Copyright Convention
The Universal Copyright Convention, adopted at Geneva, Switzer-
land, on September 6, 1952,29 affords international copyright protection
without requiring its signatories to relinquish any "formality" require-
ments.3" Thus, unlike Berne, the Universal Copyright Convention al-
lowed the United States to enter a multilateral copyright treaty without
relinquishing its "notice" requirements.31 The Universal Copyright Con-
vention recognizes and protects published and unpublished works, based
on national treatment, 2 of non-domiciled nationals, or of other member
gesting that the "normal" back door for the United States was Canada); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note
4, § 17.01.
27 Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 22. See also, NORDEMANN, supra note 20, at 5.
28 NORDEMANN, supra note 20, at 5.
29 Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 4.
30 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 17.01[B][2]. Although Berne and the Universal Copyright
Convention have separate requirements, they are not in competition with each other. The Universal
Copyright Convention gives priority to Berne where there is a relationship between two countries
who are members of both conventions. Art. XVII, Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 4,
at 178.
31 See supra note 20. See also Kaminstein, Key to Universal Copyright Protection (Article Il
Formalities), in UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANALYZED. 23 (1955); N. BOORSTYN,
COPYRIGHT LAW 331-33 (1981).
32 National treatment is defined in both the Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne
Convention. As discussed in infra notes 38-40, the United States has become a party to the Berne
Convention. In the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, "national treatment" means that
a work is afforded protection as a "Berne Convention work" if-
(1) in the case of an unpublished work, one or more of the authors is a national of a nation
adhering to the Berne Convention, or in the case of a published work, one or more of the
authors is a national of a nation adhering to the Berne Convention on the date of first
publication;
(2) the work was first published in a nation adhering to the Berne Convention, or was
simultaneously first published in a nation adhering to the Berne Convention and in a for-
eign nation that does not adhere to the Berne Convention;
(3) in the case of an audiovisual work-
(A) if one or more of the authors is a legal entity that author has its headquarters in a
nation adhering to the Berne Convention; or
(B) if one or more of the authors is an individual, that author is domiciled, or has his
or her habitual residence in, a nation adhering to the Berne Convention...
For purposes of paragraph (1), an author who is domiciled in or has his or her habitual
residence in, a nation adhering to the Berne Convention is considered to be a national of
that nation. For purposes of paragraph (2), a work is considered to have been simultane-
ously published in two or more nations if its dates of publication are within 30 days of one
another.
Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 4(a)(l)-(4), 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
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countries.33 Currently, various texts of the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion are in force in eighty-two countries, including Brazil, Japan, Mexico,
and Spain. 4 Absent from this list, however, are such developing coun-
tries as Singapore, the Philippines, and Taiwan.35 The Universal Copy-
right Convention is administered by the Copyright Law Division of
UNESCO in Paris, France.3 6
The Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention
now exist side by side. The two conventions are not viewed as mutually
exclusive; Berne is considered more far reaching in its scope and protec-
tion.37 Recently, the United States did accede to Berne while retaining
its membership in the Universal Copyright Convention. 38  The U.S. ac-
cession to Berne produced five major effects:
(1) As of March 1, 1989, U.S. copyrights will automatically be pro-
tected in over seventy-nine of the Berne Union nations;
(2) Berne Union countries will provide U.S. copyright holders the
agreed minimum level of protection;
(3) Berne members will treat U.S. nationals like their own nationals for
copyright purposes;
(4) More effective combat of piracy of U.S. works abroad; and
(5) As of March 1, 1989, foreign nationals whose works were first pub-
lished in another Union country are afforded automatic protection in
the United States. 39
However, the Berne Act is not retroactive in its coverage. There-
fore, works produced prior to March 1, 1989, will be protected, if at all,
by either the 1976 Copyright Act or the Copyright Act of 1909. o
For the film industry, in particular, the importance of this accession
was twofold. First, the Berne Convention subjected twenty-four coun-
tries,4" previously not within the diplomatic reach of the United States,
33 See Universal Copyright Convention, First Revision, Signed at Conclusion of Diplomatic
Conference in Paris (July 5-24, 1971), 943 U.N.T.S. 178. See also UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT
LAW DIGEST, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIGEST (1990)[hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW
DIGEST].
34 W. Tanenbaum, An Analysis and Guide to the Berne Convention Implementation Act
Amendments to the United States Copyright Act, 13 HAMLiNE L. REv. 253-55 (1990). See also
COPYRIGHT LAW DIGEST, supra note 33, at 25.
35 ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 30.
36 Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 4, art. VIII.
37 RICKETSON, supra note 9, at 864-66. See also STEwART, supra note 9, at 146.
38 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988). See, The United States Joins the Berne Union, Copyright Office, Library of Congress (Feb.
1989) (reprinted in BOORSTYN, supra note 31, at 514 (Supp. Aug. 1990)).
39 Highlights of U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, Copyright Office, Library of Congress
Circular 93 (Aug. 1989).
40 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-18 (1988). See also Tanenbaum, supra note 34, at 257.
41 These countries include, among others, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Egypt,
Libya, Niger, South Africa and Thailand. Berne Convention, supra note 4.
Vol. 23:623
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to potential liability for infringement of U.S. works abroad.42 Prior to its
ratification of Berne, the United States principally relied on bilateral and
subordinate multilateral treaties with these countries.4' As a result, the
United States spent significant time and money on individual negotia-
tions and had difficulty achieving compliance due to the large number of
treaties which vary greatly in their scope and coverage.' Today, the
United States enjoys a greater degree of security from infringement in
such potentially damaging countries as Brazil and Korea.4"
Second, U.S. accession to Berne has enhanced its lobbying efforts
with other Berne signatories, ideally creating higher expectations and
standards of enforcement worldwide." Previously, the United States
was in an awkward position where it had to negotiate with countries that
already offered higher standards of protection under Berne.47 By ratify-
ing Berne, the United States has acquired essential leverage with two-
dozen countries4" for which it has interests in advancing anti-piracy leg-
islation. Although this leverage is more diplomatic than substantive, the
United States has experienced an enhanced ability to negotiate with
42 Berne Convention, supra note 4, arts. 14 & 14 bis.
43 For example, in Latin America, the United States is party to the Buenos Aires Convention
on Literary and Artistic Copyrights, Aug. 11, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785, T.S. No. 593, 211 Parry's T.S.
374. This Convention affords protection to a work, once it is published in a member country. Id.
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay are the other member
countries. Id
44 Id
45 Berne Convention, supra note 4.
46 ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 16; Nix interview, supra note 7.
47 The limits on such negotiations were generally self-imposed. U.S. negotiators felt it im-
proper to push for protection beyond the mandates of the Universal Copyright Convention. INTER-
NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, TRADE LossEs DuE TO PiRAcY AND OTHER
MARKET ACCESs BARRIERs AFFECTING THE U.S. COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES 10 (Apr. 1989) [herein-
after HPA REPORT]. The IIPA was formed in 1984 and consists of the following trade associations,
representing a significant portion of the U.S. copyright industry-The Computer Software and Serv-
ices Industry Association (ADAPSO), the American Film Marketing Association (AFMA), the As-
sociation of American Publishers (AAP), the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers
Association (CBEMA), the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the National Music
Publishers' Association (NMPA), and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA).
48 Berne Convention, supra note 4. The Berne signatories include: Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Guinea, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast,
Japan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta,
Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suri-
name, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United King-
dom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. Id
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Berne signatories since its ratification.49
Both the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion provide that controversies involving interpretation of the conven-
tions may be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)."
However, this forum is only available when the parties are countries,
since individuals and organizations do not have standing before the
ICJ.51 Therefore, the ICJ provides little assistance for writers and produ-
cers of motion pictures."2
D. Bilateral Copyright Treaties
As stated previously, the United States also maintains a number of
bilateral treaties.5 3 For example, since the People's Republic of China
(the PRC) does not officially recognize the principles of international
copyright and neighboring rights protection, the United States maintains
a Friendship, Commerce & Navigation Treaty 4 (FCN treaty) with it.55
The FCN treaty provides national treatment for U.S. citizens. 56 This
means that U.S. copyright owners are not required to register their works
in the PRC as a precondition for protection. 7 The United States main-
tains this treaty, in part, because the PRC is neither a signatory to Berne
nor the Universal Copyright Convention. 8 Thus, under the FCN treaty
49 Trade Related Aspects, supra note 3, at 56.
50 Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 33, para. 1. Universal Copyright Convention, supra
note 4, art. XV.
51 Statutes of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, para. 1.
52 Indeed, to date, the ICJ has not yet been asked to rule on any substantive area of the conven-
tions. NORDEMANN, supra note 20, at 30.
53 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
54 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, United States-China, art. IX,
63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1971, as amended, Jan. 1986. [hereinafter FCN treaty]. See STEWART,
supra note 9, at 882.
55 Dept. State, Treaties in Force, 297-98 (1990). On January 1, 1979, the United States offi-
cially recognized the government of the People's Republic of China as the single legal government of
that country. Id. at 274. Under this regime, the United States maintains "unofficial relations" with
Taiwan including cultural and commercial matters. Id
56 Id. FCN treaty, supra note 54, art. IX, at 108. This article provides, in part, that:
The nationals, corporations and associations of either High Contracting Party shall be
accorded within the territory of the other.. .effective protection in the enjoyment of rights
with respect to literary and artistic works.. .[and shall enjoy] all rights and privileges of
whatever nature in regard to copyrights... and other literary, artistic and industrial prop-
erty... upon terms no less favorable than are or may be accorded to the nationals, corpora-
tions and associations of such other High Contracting Party.
Id. art. IX, at 109-10.
57 IIPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 87.
58 Taiwan continues to plague the United States in pirating films and sound recordings. Indic-
ative of this problem is the promulgation of MTV booths within Taiwan. In effect, these booths
broadcast pirated copies of motion picture clips, music videos, and television programs to a limited
audience. This technology has created a new nemesis for enforcement officials who are finding it
Vol. 23:623
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protection of U.S. copyrighted works in the PRC is covered. While pen-
alties for infringement in Taiwan are severe, the FCN treaty does not
contain adequate enforcement provisions.59 The United States merely
has a "statement" of protection without the substance of enforcement,
and the PRC continues to resist adequate enforcement of the FCN provi-
sions.6 Therefore, while the FCN treaty can be considered a strong dip-
lomatic statement by the PRC, its legal ramifications from the U.S.
standpoint are negligible.
The Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, and
the various bilateral treaties regarding intellectual property do advance
the diplomatic goal of providing international protection for copyrighted
works. However, each falls short of providing adequate enforcement
provisions. 61
E. Current Development in Trade Sanctions: GAIT and Section 301
Protection for Intellectual Property
Practitioners generally agree that treaties and conventions function
appropriately by advancing the policy of protection, and are not neces-
sarily meant to be used as enforcement "tools."'62 Therefore, the United
States has begun to include enforcement provisions for intellectual prop-
erty in its primary trade agreements in an attempt to effectuate the poli-
cies set forth in the copyright conventions. This may include
incorporating an intellectual property provision into the General Agree-
ments on Tariffs and Trade (GATI). 63 Such a provision could overcome
certain shortcomings of the current multilateral treaties by posing the
threat of trade sanctions against infringing countries." In a statement
difficult to locate and seize pirated material in this form. Nix interview, supra note 7. Watanabe,
Pulling the Plug on Pirate Videos, L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at D3, col. 1 (home ed.).
59 FCN treaty, supra note 54, art. 51. See STEwART, supra note 9, at 882 (stating that the
enforcement provisions "deal almost entirely with the procedure for, and requirements of, registra-
tion"). The treaty is broadly written and no language in article IX specifically addresses the issue of
enforcement. FCN treaty, supra note 54, art. IX, at 108-10.
60 IPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 87.
61 ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 6, 16.
62 R. BENo, PRoTYc'iNG INTELLETAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 28 (1987). See also Nix inter-
view, supra note 7.
63 Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188. Simon, supra note 8, at
89. In September 1986, the Ministers of the Contracting Parties to GATT agreed to include intel-
lectual property rights in their multilateral trade negotiations. UPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 10-
11.
64 Simon sees the current treaties as providing a "framework" for protecting intellectual prop-
erty rights such as copyrights. However, he suggests that problems with the current international
conventions include a lack of effective nation-to-nation dispute settlement provisions, obligations for
the signatories to maintain adequate, effective enforcement internally or at their borders of the rights
granted under national laws, and merely a suggestion of substantive protection which may be inade-
quate in certain circumstances. Simon, supra note 8.
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before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, U.S. Trade
Representative Carla Hills suggested that "[a] consensus seems to be
emerging that the minimum rights and obligations set out in the Berne
Convention ought to be recognized as part of a GAIT intellectual prop-
erty standard.165 Ambassador Hills further suggests that such a propo-
sal would "reiterate[ ] those features of Berne that are particularly
relevant and spell[] out the obligations where the convention is weak or
unclear.
66
The provision might be modeled after Section 2411(a) of the 1988
Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act (1988 Trade Act) 7 which re-
quires the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to take mandatory action
by way of threatening trade sanctions against a country which promul-
gates an "act, policy, or practice [that is] ... unjustifiable and burdens or
restricts United States commerce... [including an act] which denies...
the right of establishment or protection of intellectual property rights. 68
If a similarly worded initiative were added to GATT, the preeminent
multilateral trade agreement, a country would be able to counteract
piracy of copyrighted works, including motion pictures, through the
power of that country's trade representative.
An intellectual property provision in GATT could also be used to
establish minimum standards by which a signatory would be compelled
to revise its national laws in order to conform with the GATT agree-
ment, as well as to define border measures and domestic enforcement.69
Essentially, an intellectual property provision in GATT might enable the
United States to exert its power as a world trade leader as a threat
against developing countries with piracy markets.70
However, this "threat" is tempered by the difficulties in imposing
sanctions. During negotiations on a treaty to protect layout designs of
semiconductor mask works, Ambassador Hills noted that "intellectual
property-based sanctions may not be an effective means of ensuring that
governments meet their international obligations to protect intellectual
property rights."71 Trade sanctions may not necessarily offer the United
65 Trade Related Aspects, supra note 3, at 56.
66 Id.
67 1988 Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16, 1337(a)-(j)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
68 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)(1)(B).
69 Id.
70 ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
71 Trade Related Aspects, supra note 3, at 56. Hills identifies the current Administration's
trade-related intellectual property objectives as the following.
-All countries' economic growth and international competitiveness can be enhanced by
strong domestic intellectual property protection.
-When countries do not provide strong protection of intellectual property rights, and when
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States a panacea in effectuating adequate intellectual property protection
abroad. However, since there is a relationship between trade and the
protection of intellectual property rights, GATT may serve as an appro-
priate forum for discussing an increase in the minimum level of protec-
tion member countries offer their trading partners.72
A second development73 in the area of intellectual property trade
protection is amended Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988. 71 The revision of Section 301, popularly known as
"Super 301,"17 gives the USTR authority to enact mandatory or discre-
tionary trade sanctions76 by way of accelerated investigations in coun-
tries which deny the United States "adequate and effective" intellectual
property protection.77 The amendment creates and enforces reciprocity
of foreign market access.7"
Under Section 301, the USTR is required to identify and designate
certain problematic countries as "priority" countries.79 This priority
designation allows the USTR to focus efforts on countries that pose the
an effective system of international enforcement does not exist, then substantial distortions
in international production and trade result.
-The United States has a very substantial stake in a healthy system of international trade
and strong protection of intellectual property.
Unfortunately, many countries do not realize that improved protection of intellectual
property is in their interest, or knowing it do not pursue it; and trade problems for U.S.
producers have inevitably resulted. Theses policies cause three types of trade-related
problems for Americans.
FrosT, U.S. companies lose exports and foreign sales, royalties, and the value of in-
vestments in the market where the American intellectual property right is appropriated
without compensation.
SEcoND, our firms lose sales in third markets when unauthorized products are sold
there.
FINALLY, U.S. companies may lose sales in our own country to imports--involving
unauthorized use of goods, works, or processes covered by U.S. intellectual property laws.
Id at 55-56.
72 Id
73 Comment, Section 301 of the Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Its History and Impli-
cations in the US.-South Korea Trade, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 551. See also Bentsen to Make
Omnibus Trade Bill High Priority in 1987, Tough Measure Expected, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1359
(Nov. 12, 1986).
74 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 et seq. (Supp.
1988)).
75 Comment, supra note 73, at 551.
76 Id.
77 ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
78 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. 1988).
79 In November 1989, the following five countries were designated "priority" by Ambassador
Hills: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Thailand. Previously, Taiwan, Korea, and Saudi Arabia
were included in the "priority" category, however, in November 1989, they were moved to a secon-
dary watch list. U.S. Works to Make Intellectual Property Protection GATT-Compatible, DAILY
REP. Exac. 5-31 (Jan. 17, 1990).
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greatest threat of infringement on U.S. copyrighted works. Although
such a designation is viewed as a useful tool in threatening trade sanc-
tions against certain countries, it is not necessarily a complete remedy80
The effectiveness of Super 301 involves the extent to which a particular
country relies on U.S. exports."' Thus, Super 301 requires that the pri-
ority country at least perceive a threat to its trade balance in order for
the provision to accomplish its effect.
In 1988, the Motion Picture Export Association of America (the
MPEAA) 2 filed its first amended Section 301 petition against South Ko-
rea. 3 From the South Korean viewpoint, this challenge presented itself
one year after its new Copyright Act came into force." South Korea had
agreed in November 1985 to allow film companies to establish Korean
offices and freely distribute their films to Korean theaters, television sta-
tions and home video stores.8 5 However, the South Korean censorship
procedure did not allow any single company to maintain more than one
film on its waiting list for approval at any one time. The MPEAA ar-
gued that its U.S. constituents were under a de facto quota since such
approval can take up to three months, thereby limiting a company's dis-
tribution to between four and six films each year.86
Although the petition was voluntarily withdrawn, 7 the United
States did achieve an advantage under this Section 301 petition since the
South Korean government gave the United States assured access to an
unencumbered South Korean market.8 8
On November 15, 1990, a coalition including the IIPA, the Record-
ing Industry Association of America (the RIAA) and the MPEAA fied
a Section 301 complaint against Thailand for its "alleged failure to en-
80 ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
81 Id.
82 The MPEAA is the foreign trade arm of the MPAA.
83 US., South Korea Reach Accord on Movie Distribution, Avoiding 301 Case, 5 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1444 (Nov. 2, 1988); Comment, supra note 73, at 559.
84 See text accompanying infra note 86. See also Chang In Suk, Letter from the Republic of
Korea, 3 COPYRIGHT 90 (Mar. 1989).
85 Unfair Trade Practices, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1269 (Sept. 21, 1988).
86 Id.
87 Id
88 Id. As written, the Copyright Act for the Republic of Korea protects foreign works on a
bilateral, reciprocal basis:
Protection of foreigners' works
Article 3(1) Foreigners' works shall be protected under treaties which the Republic of
Korea has entered into or signed. Provided that they are published prior to the effective
date of the treaty concerned, the protection under this Act shall not be granted... (3)... if
the foreign country concerned does not protect works of the nationals of the Republic of
Korea, the protection under treaties and this Act may be restricted correspondingly.
Copyright Act No. 3916, Dec. 31, 1986, reprinted in 7-8 COPYRIGHT, Laws and Treaties, Text 1-01,
at 2 (July-Aug. 1988)[hereinafter 1987 Act].
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force its copyright law against manufacturers of pirated audio and video-
cassettes." 9 Thailand had been on the U.S. "watch list" and allegedly
had not prosecuted Thai violators under its own criminal law.'
Section 301 actions, however, may be harmful to the United States if
they are used too broadly as a "strong-arm" tactic because they create
unnecessary diplomatic tension with potential trade allies.91 For exam-
ple, Super 301 would probably not be effective if used against a country
such as Japan because the cost in overall trade relations would outweigh
the benefit of a concession regarding copyright protection. For these rea-
sons, enforcement through trade sanctions is a viable, but limited solu-
tion to curbing infringement worldwide.
III. THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT
Although current treaties and lobbying efforts for expanding copy-
right protection of U.S. films in the world market serve as a starting
point, lost revenues continue to increase as foreign enforcement fails to
defeat the pirates. The United States faces several barriers to effective
foreign enforcement, including increasingly sophisticated electronics
technology, limited extraterritorial jurisdiction over infringement action
occurring abroad, and procedural constraints of foreign courts and
tribunals.
A. Technology
United States studios release their films in a "sequential release
schedule."92 This means the film is generally released in the domestic
market at least six months prior to the international home video re-
lease.93 If a copy of the film is pirated early in the distribution cycle, all
subsequent markets are adversely affected. 94
In this regard, motion picture pirates utilize six major copying
methods, including: (1) illegal duplication of theatrical prints;95 (2) back-
89 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1768 (Nov. 21, 1990).
90 I at 1645 (Oct. 31, 1990). The petition estimated that the alleged piracy in Thailand of
U.S. videocassettes, audio cassettes, books and software was between $700-100 million in 1990. Id,
at 1768.
91 Comment, supra note 73, at 563; Secretary of State Schultz Warns Nations of Pacific Against
Economic Complacency, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1283 (Sept. 21, 1988).
92 MPAA/NMEAA, Fact Sheet: Film dnd Video Piracy 1 (1989) [hereinafter MPAA Fact
Sheet]. The industry describes the release schedule as the following "chain" of events: "Often [the
sequential release schedule] includes a first exhibition in the U.S. theaters, followed by theaters in the
international markets, the domestic home video market, pay cable and then network television and
finally broadcast TV syndication." Id
93 Id
94 Id.
95 This method is restricted to large operations possessing sophisticated technology allowing
infringement by an actual duplication of a film original to a new print.
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to-back video copying;96 (3) counterfeit labels and packaging of illegal
videotapes;97 (4) signal theft;9" (5) unauthorized public performances; 99
(6) and parallel imports." The most prevalent method in the United
States is back-to-back copying of videocassettes. 1 ' Here, a retailer ob-
tains one legitimate copy and makes duplicates by connecting one VCR
to another."02 With the advances in dual-deck VCRs, back-to-back copy-
ing will significantly increase.103
In Go-Video Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd ,14 an American developer
of dual-deck VCRs filed suit against a number of foreign manufacturers
for trade and patent infringement alleging that they conspired to prevent
marketing of dual-decks in the United States in violation of the Sherman
Act.105 Go-Video represents the potentially lucrative future of back-to-
back pirating through the use of dual-decks.1 "6 Currently, the U.S. mo-
tion picture industry loses over $100 million annually from this method
at home, and over $700 million worldwide. 10 7
Satellite piracy, a form of signal theft, is an especially acute problem
abroad.108 With satellite piracy, programs, not licensed in a particular
96 Back-to-back copying is the fastest-growing area of individual, home piracy. Bollier, supra
note 2, at 35. See also infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
97 Counterfeit labelling predominates in the small video store arena, whereby a local merchant
is able to duplicate and sell or rent a pirated version as an "original."
98 Signal theft involves re-transmission of film and video broadcasts via satellite and cable
interception.
99 This form of piracy predominates in Taiwan where MTV booths are constructed to allow a
small group of viewers to watch pirated films in relatively private surroundings.
100 MPAA Fact Sheet, supra note 92, at 1.
101 Bollier, supra note 2, at 31. "In the United States it may be necessary to wait six months •
after [a movie's] theatrical debut.. .but visit a ramshackle video store in Ankara, Turkey, and
chances are that an illicit cassette of a first-run blockbuster is available within weeks of its U.S.
release." Id
102 Bollier, Video Dragnet, VmEo, Mar. 1988, at 49, 105 [hereinafter Video Dragnet].
103 The availability of dual-deck VCRs will further enhance this piracy option. Hunt, Home
Tech Video: Revolutionary Dual-Deck VCR Headed to Marketplace, L.A. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at
F28, col. 1 (home ed.).
104 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
105 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
106 885 F.2d at 1406. In Go-Video, Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that dual-deck technology
raise[s] the possibility of video "pirating" or "bootlegging" and have consequently been the
source of some controversy among consumers, potential manufacturers and those who
hold copyrights of material distributed on videocassette. Possibly as a result of this contro-
versy, dual deck machines-manufactured under any patent-are not yet generally avail-
able in the United States. Id. See generally, Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine,
101 HARv. L. REV. 1661, 1665-66, 1669-72 (1988); Comment, The Home Use Videotaping
Controversy: Fair Use or Fair Game?, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 363, 394-98 (1983).
Id. at 1407 n.1.




country, are intercepted by satellite dishes and re-transmitted via cable
TV or network broadcast. 9 It is possible for international television
viewers to watch an unreleased film months before it reaches their thea-
ters. This type of piracy costs the United States $320 million each
year.110
Compounding the problem, rapid technological advancements have
enabled even the least sophisticated pirate to produce remarkably clear
copies at a relatively low cost.' Enforcement officials and pirates are
engaged in an escalating technological war. For pirates, however, new
technology is a double-edged sword since prevention and investigation
techniques are also becoming increasingly refined and efficient.' 12
New prevention and enforcement technology include: (1) digital en-
cryption encoding (DEC) of satellite signals which allows television net-
works to protect their affiliate feeds;113 (2) a Coded Anti-Piracy system
(CAP) 114 which identifies and tracks 35 mm theatrical prints;" 5 and (3)
Macrovision,"16 which encodes prerecorded videocassettes frustrating
current duplication techniques." 7 Although none of the above technolo-
gies is foolproof, these advancements do raise the threshold difficulty and
expense of pirating copies."11 For the modem thief, however, the attrac-
tion of receiving free programming and motion picture transmission far
outweighs the difficulty of finding or constructing decoding devices. De-
coding pirates range from the basement handyman to mass-producers
who are marketing such equipment in an increasingly open manner.119
For example, some 100,000 decoders were sold in a French-speaking part
of Switzerland, enabling viewers to receive the popular French Canal
Plus channel. 120
In addition to incorporating technological deterrents, the nine major
109 Id
110 Id
111 See Smith, Video Piracy-We're the Best!, E.T.I., Sept. 18, 1989 (Australian trade maga-
zine); ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
112 Video Dragnet, supra note 102, at 50.
113 DEC enables broadcasters to track the signals transmitted via satellite to earth stations
worldwide. This technology is mostly utilized by national broadcasters who have an interest in
tracing the ultimate destinations of programming fed through satellites.
114 CAP technology allows a film producer to encode a film print, thereby giving it a personal-
ized "fingerprint." This code becomes a permanent record on the print and can not be removed
without destroying the film itself.
115 35 mm is the standard size of films produced by the major U.S. production studios.
116 Bollier, supra note 2, at 35. See also infra note 193 and accompanying text.
117 ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 33.
118 Bierbaum, Video Pirates Out on the Gangplank MPAA-Assisted Raids Gain in '88, VARErY
Jan. 3, 1989, at 3; Nix interview, supra note 7.
119 Chaubeau, The Unlawful Decoding of Encrypted Television Signals and the Protection of
Authors and Producers of Audiovisual Works, 12 COPYRIGHT 368 (1990).
120 Id.
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U.S. studios 121 belong to a private investigatory force known as the Film
Security Office (FSO). The FSO, which operates on a $15 million budget,
monitors piracy operations worldwide. 122 Although FSO has no official
authority, it does conduct preliminary investigations and promote better
security practices in the industry through the publication of newsletters
reflecting the current trends of technology and enforcement. 123 The FSO
also reports its findings to the USTR, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tions (the FBI), and customs officials, thereby facilitating additional ap-
prehension of international pirating operations.
B. Evidentiary and Procedural Obstacles
Domestic enforcement of U.S. film copyright relies on the search
and seizure of illegal duplications by the FBI.124 Internationally, enforce-
ment is tremendously difficult. 2 5 Since U.S. copyright laws do not have
an extra-territorial effect, 126 even in countries that are parties to copy-
right treaties,1 27 enforcement must be coordinated within a country's
own legal system.1 28  Such a constraint presents a myriad of evidentiary
and procedural obstacles.1
29
Economically, developing countries would eventually benefit from
stricter enforcement of copyright and intellectual property laws.
131
121 Theses studios include: Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., De Laurentis Entertainment
Group, Inc., the Walt Disney Co., MGM/UA Communications Co., Orion Pictures Co., Paramount
Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios, Inc., and Warner Bros.,
Inc.
122 Bollier, supra note 2, at 31.
123 Id. at 34.
124 The MPAA has a U.S. anti-piracy operation which has investigated some 10,000 cases of
piracy and assisted in over 1,000 raids. These raids have resulted in a seizure of almost 300,000
illegal videocassettes and 32,000 film prints. In addition, the MPAA estimates that over 520 crimi-
nal convictions have been obtained with resulting damage awards totaling well over $2 million.
MPAA Fact Sheet, supra note 92, at 2.
125 Nix interview, supra note 7.
126 Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1911); Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films,
783 F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1986); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Before any federal district court will confer jurisdiction over an infringement action, the plaintiff
must allege that the subject matter is actionable, at least in part, in the United States. Peter Starr,
783 F.2d at 1442. However, when part of the profits derived from the infringement occurred abroad,
the plaintiff can recover through a constructive trust. Fantasy, 664 F. Supp. at 1351. See also, 3 M.
NIMMER, supra note 4, §§ 14.05 & 17.03.
A federal district court may also assume jurisdiction over a case where the plaintiff asserts a
valid cause of action under the copyright laws of the foreign country and the court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. London Film Prod., Inc. v. Intercontinental Communications Inc.,
580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
127 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
128 ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
129 Nix interview, supra note 7.
130 That developing countries can benefit from increased intellectual property protection ap-
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However, many countries which are in their infancy with regard to man-
ufacturing and technology have little domestic protection for copyright-
holding nationals, let alone international protection. Even among devel-
oped countries, protection for artistic works varies.
For example, the USTR currently lists Brazil as a priority country
under Section 301.1'1 The USTR has also instituted Section 301 actions
against Brazil for copyright infringement. 132  The United States main-
tains a bilateral treaty for copyright protection with Brazil, 3 3 and Brazil
does adhere to the major multilateral copyright conventions, including
Berne, 134 the Universal Copyright Convention, 135 and the Buenos Aires
pears to be an oxymoron. As Richard Rapp and Richard Rozek argue, however, such protection
offers both benefits and detriments to a developing country's economy:
1. On the benefit side, there is a causal linkage between economic modernization and the
presence of efficient property rights, including intellectual property rights. Efficient prop-
erty rights equate private and social rates of return, thereby providing incentives for eco-
nomic actors (individuals and firms) to engage in protection and enforcement against
infringement, prevent free-riding on private innovation. Because innovation is the well-
spring of economic development, modernizing economies benefit from intellectual property
protection. While these benefits may be more difficult to realize in economies that are
underdeveloped and static, it is certain that more advanced economies need to encourage
technological change--both indigenous and imported-in order to create self-reinforcing
cycles of growth in productivity and human welfare.
2. On the cost side, the fear of high prices arising from patent protection is based on a
mistaken view of how competition works. The basic fallacy is that patents necessarily
convey market power. In fact, although patents allow innovators to capture gains from
their innovation, these gains may take the from of foothold access to well-populated, com-
petitive markets which permit sellers to do no more than charge competitive prices and
earn competitive returns, including the returns to innovation. There are, to be sure, cases
where an innovation represents so drastic a departure from the status quo that an entirely
new market is created and prices and profits are high. Such cases are very rare. Far more
common is the case of "leapfrog" or dynamic competition wherein technological progress
occurs by modest accretions to the store of knowledge and technique in competitive mar-
kets: a product or process improvement begets a small competitive advantage. The innova-
tor has a choice; it can price the product at or near the prevailing price of close substitutes
and make an easy entry into the market (by dint of its competitive advantage), or it can
charge a premium for the patented characteristic and enter in a slower, smaller way (be-
cause of the higher price). Either way, consumers benefit from greater choice and more
competition.
Rapp & Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection, 5 J. WORLD TRADE 75, 101-02
(1990).
131 See supra note 79.
132 UPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 12.
133 Agreement Providing for Reciprocal Copyright Protection of Literary, Artistic, and Scien-
tific Works, Apr. 2, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 427, 290 U.N.T.S. 119.
134 Berlin Convention, 1908, Decrees No. 4541 of Feb. 9, 1922 and No. 15.530 of June 21, 1922
(Diario Oficial, Feb. 8, 1922 and June 29, 1922).
135 As adopted in Geneva in 1952: UNESCO, Copyright Bulletin, vol. XII, no. 2, at 247 (1959);
As revised in Paris on July 24, 1971: UNESCO, Copyright Bulletin, vol. IX, no. 4, at 3 (1975).
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Convention,136 however, Brazil does not adequately enforce its own do-
mestic copyright legislation.137
The Brazilian Law on the Rights of Authors and Other Provisions
(LRA) 38 has designated the National Copyright Counsel (the NCC) as
the body responsible "for supervision, advice and assistance with respect
to copyright and the rights related to it."'1 39 The NCC is required, in
part, to
decide on, direct, coordinate and supervise the measures necessary for
the correct application of the laws and international conventions rati-
fied by Brazil concerning copyrights related to it... [and to] supervise
the strict and faithful compliance of producers of videophonograms
and phonograms, publishers and copyright associations with their obli-
gations towards the owners of authors' and performers' rights and ef-
fect, at the latter's request, all the necessary verifications, including
audits and inspections of accounts .... 140
The LRA vests broad authority in the NCC, and the United States con-
tinues to rely on the NCC's enforcement of Brazilian copyright
obligations. 1
41
The LRA also provides strict sanctions for Brazilian copyright
infringers: 14
2
Any person who prints a literary, artistic or scientific work without the
authorization of the author shall surrender to the latter such copies as
are seized and shall pay him for the remainder of the edition the price
at which it was sold or at which it is evaluated... If the number of
copies constituting the unlawful edition is not known, the guilty party
shall pay the value of two thousand copies in addition to the copies
seized. 143
Criminal penalties provide a maximum of four years imprisonment and a
fine of over $120,000.1" Although the LRA provisions appear to pro-
mulgate prevention and enforcement of foreign copyright infringement in
136 Pan American Copyright Convention (Buenos Aires), Aug. 11, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785, T.S.
No. 593, 155 L.N.T.S. 179. Brazil approved the convention by Decree No. 2881 of Nov. 9, 1914,
and promulgated the convention by Decree No. 11.588 of May 19, 1915.
137 IIPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 12. "[Video and software piracy remains
high... principally due both to the difficulty in getting Brazilian enforcement authorities to effec-
tively prosecute violators, and to the low level of penalties imposed." Id.
138 Brazil, C.C., Law No. 5988 of Dec. 14, 1973, reprinted in COPYRIGHT L. & T. WORLD
(Supp. 1987-88).
139 Id. art. 116.
140 Id. arts. 117(i)-(ix).
141 IIPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 15-16.
142 Brazil, C.C., Law No. 5988, arts. 122-34.
143 Id. art. 122.
144 Penalties for Infringement of Copyright, C.P., Law No. 2.848 of Dec. 7, 1940, as amended
by Law No. 6895 of Dec. 17, 1980, arts. 184-86.
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Brazil, the United States has experienced reluctance on the part of Bra-
zilian officials to enforce the statutory provisions. 45 As a result, the
IIPA recommends that the United States use further Section 301 pro-
ceedings to compel Brazil to improve enforcement of its laws.'" How-
ever, as stated above, the dynamics surrounding Section 301, regarding
the costs and benefits of threatening trade sanctions to a potential trade
ally, might decrease the effectiveness of this tactic. In the meantime,
U.S. losses from Brazilian film and video piracy amount to $17 million
each year. 147
While the copyright law in Brazil is drafted to provide for enforce-
ment, the original copyright statute in the Republic of Korea 4 ' does not,
in itself, provide a sufficient enforcement statement.,49 In 1987, the KCS
included a broad exclusion for infringement of works already published:
"The reproduction of a work already published by means of one of the
following methods shall not be deemed to infringe on the copyright:...
Providing a phonograph record or magnetic tape for use in a public per-
formance or broadcast."'"5 Although most countries, including the
United States, have provisions for "fair use"'' of copyrighted works,
this provision severely restricted protection for foreign, as well as domes-
tic copyright holders in Korea, because it is liberally drafted without
exception. 15
2
In July 1987, Korea did enact a new copyright law, partly as a result
of pressure from the United States under a Section 301 action.'53 Under
the new copyright law, Korea agreed to adhere to the Universal Copy-
right 54 and Geneva Phonograms Conventions,' 55 to intensify its per-
formance law with respect to movies and phonograms, 156 and to expand
145 HPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 15.
146 Id. at 16.
147 Id. at 12.
148 Copyright Law, No. 432, ch. I (Jan. 28, 1957)[hereinafter KCS].
149 IIPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 36.
150 KCS, supra note 148, arts. 64(1)-(8).
151 The doctrine of "fair use" implies a consent by an author for republication of his works to
promote discussion or criticism of the work itself or encourage the advancement of new ideas. In
Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that fair
use depends on a variety of factors including: "(1) The nature and purpose of the respective works;
(2) The quantity and importance of the portions taken; (3) The relation of the portions used to the
respective works of which they are a part; [and] (4) The impact of the use of these portions upon the
demand for the copyrighted publication." 421 F.2d 279, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1970).
152 KCS, supra note 148, arts. 64(I)-(8).
153 Copyright Act of 1986, No. 3916, Dec. 31, 1986. UlPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 36. See
also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
154 As adopted in Geneva in 1952: UNESCO, Copyright Bulletin, vol. XXI, no. 2, at 4 (1987).
As revised at Paris on July 24, 1971: UNESCO, Copyright Bulletin, vol. XXI, no. 4, at.6 (1987).
I5 UNESCO, Copyright Bulletin, vol. XXI, no. 3, at 6 (1987).
156 IIPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 36.
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coverage to computer programs published between 1982 and 1987.'
The 1987 enactment, however, contains extensive gaps: (1) no regulation
on retransmission rights via cable or satellite television;15 (2) absence of
videocassettes from the category of phonorecords under Article 94 pro-
tection;15 9 (3) no protection for works produced prior to October 1,
1987;160 and (4) no provision for making possession of infringing works
for the purpose of trade a crime.1 61 Although not explicitly stated in the
new law, these gaps fail to provide countries such as the United States,
which produce the majority of imported records and videocassettes into
South Korea, any additional protection than previously granted by the
old copyright statute.
Besides the drafting and enforcement shortcomings found in Korean
copyright law, several countries have enacted copyright legislation rid-
died with procedural formalities. In 1985, the PRC passed a copyright
law offering greater protection of works created after 1975.162 However,
procedural formalities thwart both United States and the PRC citizens'
attempts to enforce their rights. 63 These formalities include: (1) requir-
ing plaintiffs to post a bond to cover court costs; (2) reluctance to enforce
U.S. judgments in the PRC; (3) issuing censorship certificates to pirates;
and (4) failure to monitor pirates' use of forged documents which im-
pedes claims made by rightful owners.' 4 While these formalities argua-
bly might effectively allow the PRC to monitor internal infringement
actions, U.S. officials suggest that such formalities are both unnecessary
and burdensome.1 65
157 Computer Program Protection Act, No. 3920, Dec. 31, 1986.
158 1987 Act, supra note 88. See also IIPA REPORT, supra note 47, at 42.
159 Id at 43.
160 Id at 36.
161 Id at 42.
162 Id. at 87.
163 id. at 93.
164 Id The IIPA recommends that the following four practices in Taiwan be eliminated:
(1) the requirement that the plaintiff post a bond of up to four percent of the claim to cover
court costs; (2) the lengthy, complex and expensive process for enforcing the U.S. court
judgments in Taiwan; (3) the prohibition against plaintiffs proceeding in infringement ac-
tions on the basis of a general power of attorney, since the current requirement that a
specific defendant be named in each power of attorney prevents quick action against in-
fringers, and is wholly unnecessary; and (4) the requirement that court papers and affida-
vits be "consularized" by a CCNAA [Coordinating Committee for North American





IV. REDRESS AND DAMAGES
A. Domestic
The United States has national legislation against intellectual prop-
erty piracy under the Copyright Act of 1976.166 This Act provides com-
prehensive protection and redress in the U.S. courts. 67 Under the Act,
both civil and criminal actions may be brought against infringers. 16  The
Act was amended in 1982, substantially increasing penalties for illegal
duplication of copyrighted works. 169 Copyright Act infringement cases
are rarely litigated. The FBI investigates the claim, the plaintiff seeks a
cease and desist order, and the pirating operation usually pays its fine
without objection. 170
If the plaintiff does litigate her claim, she must first obtain an ex
parte writ of seizure' from a federal district court' 72 FBI investigators
then send a U.S. Marshall to seize the pirated tapes, conduct an on-site
search of the premises, and assess the amount of damages.173 To prevail
in an infringement action, the plaintiff must prove three elements: (1)
ownership of the copyright in issue, (2) copying by the defendant, and (3)
damages. 174
(1) Ownership
Under section 410(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976, "in any judicial
proceeding the certificate of registration made before or within five years
after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of
the validity of copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate."' 175
This means that where the plaintiff is the author of the work, the mere
introduction of the registration certificate into evidence will presump-
tively establish that she is the owner of the copyright and that the copy-
166 See supra note 40.
167 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 eL seq. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
168 Id. The Communications Act of 1984 and its subsequent amendments provide penalties
and remedies comparable to the Copyright Act of 1976 against satellite and cable TV pirates.
169 Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, P.L. No. 97-180 (May 24, 1982). The
act provides: "(a) whoever.. .knowingly traffics in a counterfeit label affixed or designed to be affixed
to a phonorecord, or to a copy of a motion picture, or an audiovisual work, shall be fined not more
than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both." Id. § 2318.
170 Telephone interview with Judy Denenholz, Vice-President, Domestic and International
Anti-Piracy, Walt Disney Co. (Feb. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Denenholz interview].
171 An exparte writ of seizure is a court order enabling an officer of the law to unilaterally take
into custody real or personal property. BLAcK's LAW DInrIoNARY 1359 (6th ed. 1990).
172 Telephone interview with John Leonard, Chicago counsel for the MPAA (Feb. 2, 1990)
[hereinafter Leonard interview].
173 Id
174 Booasr N, supra note 31, § 10:10, at 288.
175 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (Supp. 1991).
1991]
CASE W. RE& J. INT'L V 6
right itself is valid. 176 When the plaintiff is not the author, but rather an
exclusive licensee or transferee, as in most motion picture cases, the
plaintiff must also establish a valid chain of title, or standing to sue, and
produce the license agreement which was properly recorded in the Copy-
right Office.177
(2) Copying
Once the plaintiff has proven ownership, she must then establish
that the defendant copied her work. Since direct evidence of copying is
usually not available, 171 courts have established that if the plaintiff can
show the defendant had access to her work and the defendant's work is
substantially similar to the plaintiff's work, then copying is presumed. 179
(3) Damages
After the plaintiff has met her burden of proof concerning infringe-
ment, she is entitled to damages. Specifically, section 504(a) of the 1976
Copyright Act provides that the plaintiff may elect to receive either "(1)
the copyright owner's actual damages and any profits of the in-
fringer.. .or (2) statutory damages."' 180 The plaintiff may also be entitled
to injunctive relief in the form of preliminary or permanent injunctions,
or temporary restraining orders.18'
176 Arica Inst. v. Palmer, 761 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D.N.Y 1991); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-
America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.J. 1982). See also, BooRsTYN, supra note 31, § 10:11, at 288-
89.
177 BOORn'YN, supra note 31, § 10:11, at 289.
178 Id § 10:12, at 289.
179 Most courts find that the plaintiff has met her burden of proving "access" if she proves that
the defendant had a "reasonable opportunity" to see or hear the plaintiff's work. Arica, 761 F. Supp.
at 1056; Pellegrino v. American Greetings Corp., 592 F. Supp. 459 (D. S.D. 1984), affld without op.
760 F.2d 272 (8th Cir.); Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981). See
also BOORsrYN, supra note 31, § 10:13, at 290.
A less accepted, more restrictive view suggests that the defendant must actually have viewed the
material in issue to satisfy the access requirement. Meta-Film Assoc., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F.
Supp. 1346 (C.D. Cal 1984)(where the defendant, Stephen King, had no access to plaintiff's work
based on "corporate receipt" because King was not in a relationship with the plaintiff corporation).
To prove the "substantial similarity" element, the plaintiff faces the seemingly insurmountable
obstacle of proving how similar is similar? Therefore, courts have adopted the "ordinary observer or
audience" test. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983); O'Neill v. Dell Pub. Co., 630 F.2d 685
(lst Cir. 1980); Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
180 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) & (2) (Supp. 1991). Establishing actual damages is often difficult for
the plaintiff, therefore courts have historically allowed expert testimony on the value of the plaintiff's
work in a particular market and on whether the defendant's infringing work competes in the same
market. Lottie Joplin Thomas Tr. v. Crown Pub., Inc., 592 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1978); Alouf v.
Expansion Prod., Inc., 417 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1969); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp.,
162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947). See also, BooRSTYN, supra note 31, § 10:15, at 300-02.




Abroad, the United States must rely on diplomacy and the judicial
system of the country involved.'" 2 Thus, a U.S. film company is inher-
ently more vulnerable outside its own territory. In 1987, pirating of U.S.
motion pictures in Spain was nearly 100 percent.'83 Spanish copyright
law simply did not adequately deter potential pirates.'8 4 After extensive
lobbying efforts, the United States began alleviating the problem by con-
vincing the Spanish government to change its copyright law.' With
these changes in place, in December 1988, the rate of piracy had substan-
tially decreased. 86 However, lobbying efforts are inherently slow and
cannot keep pace with the rapidly changing technology inherent in the
electronic media industry.
On the other hand, in Israel, statutory damages are allowed as proof
of actual damages by law.'8 7 This procedure is beneficial for U.S. copy-
right holders for two reasons: (1) since the amount of infringement is
determined by statute in the civil case, proof of actual damages in the
criminal proceeding is expedited; and (2) the judicial process is simplified
because the statute creates a clearly defined standard for penalties. 88
V. CONCLUSION
Faced with the seemingly insurmountable obstacle of protecting cre-
ative works produced in the United States and distributed in the interna-
tional marketplace, organizations such as the MPAA and the MPEAA,
as well as trade-based umbrella organizations such as the IIPA,8 9 have
consistently lobbied Congress to strengthen both copyright protection
standards and the penalties for infringement. 90
These intellectual property advocates agree that the most effective
means of combating all forms of international piracy is through increased
lobbying efforts in countries where gaps between copyright law and en-
forcement exist.' 9 ' Although the amounts lost from international piracy
seem staggering, officials see a positive trend in those countries which
have been persuaded to clarify legislation and to increase penalties.' 92
182 Nix interview, supra note 6.






189 IIPA REPORT, supra note 47, at iii. The Alliance represents 1600 companies who collec-
tively generated in excess of $270 billion in revenues in 1988. Id at i.
190 Nix interview, supra note 7.
191 iPA REPORT, supra note 47; ANNENBERG REPORT, supra note 8.
192 Nix interview, supra note 7; IIPA REPORT, supra note 47.
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However, lobbying is an inherently slow process and, by itself, can not
adequately disrupt the rapidly expanding pirated videotape marketplace.
With the advancements of Macrovision 193 and microchip technol-
ogy, 94 the United States should consider broader implementation of
electronic combative technology. Although, the greatest potential for en-
forcement of a legitimate videotape market is through lobbying efforts at
the governmental level, these efforts will have little or no effect on the
vast numbers of black market pirates.
Given the current lack of interest by foreign officials in the confisca-
tion and prosecution of pirating operations in developing countries such
as the PRC, the U.S. film industry should subsidize research to advance
electronic protection. For example, a system might be developed
whereby an electronic strip is integrated into original film and videocas-
sette tape much like an additional soundtrack, thus rendering the origi-
nals immune from second-hand copying except through certified
machines. Of course the industry must weigh the benefits of such tech-
nology against the cost of creating and marketing it.
Once the United States has successfully lobbied the IIPA "priority"
countries, officials should continue to hold out for stiffer penalties
abroad. Especially in developing countries such as Singapore and the
PRC, even the strongest diplomacy will not deter piracy where a signifi-
cant profit potential remains. Therefore, the prosecution of foreign pi-
rates must include penalties strong enough to send a ripple through the
underground markets.
James J Merriman*
193 Currently, Macrovision encodes videocassettes with signals that distort the sound and pic-
ture of reproductions. However, only VHS machines are susceptible. Therefore, the process is not
one hundred percent effective. Bollier, supra note 2, at 35.
194 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve School of Law (1991).
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